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EUSA Conference: Can big be beautiful?
IT IS AN HONOR TO SERVE as Chair of the European Union
Studies Association for the next two years. I am very
much aware that my predecessor, John Keeler has
strengthened the association over the past two years.
He steered EUSA through successful negotiations with
the University of Pittsburgh. Pittsburgh houses our ad-
ministrative office, and co-pays the salary of EUSA’s
executive director, Joe Figliulo.
Joe’s multifaceted talents came into their own at
the Montreal conference which he organized with hu-
mor, grace and promptness. EUSA is also grateful to
the European Commission, which provided financial
support for the conference.
Thanks also to the three members of the executive
committee whose terms have just ended: Sophie
Meunier, Virginie Giraudon, and Grainne de Burca. Each
brought considerable wit and conviction to the excom.
Amy Verdun, Frank Schimmelfennig, and I are now
joined by Neil Fligstein (vice-Chair), Erik Jones, Dan
Kelemen, and Craig Parsons. Craig has agreed to be-
come editor of the EUSA Newsletter Forum Section from
this Winter issue onward. Amy Verdun takes over as
Secretary, and Frank Schimmelfennig as Treasurer.
Andy Smith continues as the book reviews editor of the
EUSA Newsletter.
I am writing this letter when the tenth conference in
Montreal—the first one outside the United States—is
still fresh in memory. I would like to draw some (per-
sonal) lessons as well as look ahead to our next con-
ference in 2009.
The Montreal conference was the largest ever. Six
hundred fifty individuals attended 120 panels with 500
papers. The conference was one third larger than Aus-
tin in 2005. This was driven by a steep increase in ap-
plications: 400 paper proposals compared to 250,
and 105 panel proposals compared to 55 for Austin—
about a doubling. To meet this demand, the program
committee guided by its chair, Wade Jacoby, increased
the number of simultaneous panels from eight to ten,
and placed at least four papers in each panel. The ac-
ceptance rate for papers was 57 percent, and for pan-
els 71 percent.
More panels gave the conference greater depth and
breadth. I think it is fair to say that EUSA is the most
diverse, multidisciplinary intellectual gathering on EU
studies. One can get an idea of this by looking at the
diversity of panels at the conference across twelve
themes (these are from the list that EUSA uses to ask
you to describe your intellectual interests when you sign
up as member).
This was the first conference where we asked you
to submit your paper online. This will cost our associa-
tion $2000 in lost paper room sales, but makes access
to the conference open to (younger) scholars who could
not come to the meeting. We are grateful to the Net-
work of European Union Centers of Excellence (EUCE),
based at the University of North Carolina in Chapel Hill,
for financing, uploading and maintaining the website: http:/
/www.unc.edu/euce. The papers will remain accessible
there until six months before the next conference, at
which point they will be transferred to the web archive at
the University of Pittsburgh. At the beginning of July, there
were 268 papers online.
It is still possible to upload the paper you pre-
sented if you have not done so already or send a
revised version. Please send it to
montrealpapers@unc.edu, and make sure to mention
number and title of the panel. The program is acces-
sible on the EUCE website.
In the remainder of this letter, I would like to initiate a
conversation on the shape of future conferences.
EUSA Montreal – panel distribution by topic
Democracy 7
Economics, political economy 13
Enlargement 11
Europeanization 6
External Relations 2 0
Governance 15
Institutions 12
Law, courts 3
Parties, interest groups, lobbying 7
Public policy 13
Theories of Integration 8
Voting, public opinion 3
*two unclassified teaching panels
2     Summer  2007   EUSA Review
The EUSA Review (ISSN 1535-7031) [formerly the ECSA
Review] is published four times yearly by the European
Union Studies Association, a membership association and
non-profit organization (founded in 1988 as the European
Community Studies Association) devoted to the exchange
of information and ideas on the European Union. We
welcome the submission of scholarly manuscripts.
Subscription to the EUSA Review is a benefit of
Association membership.
Managing Editor
Joseph A. Figliulo
Forum and Features Editor
Amy Verdun (University of Victoria)
Book Reviews Editor
Andrew Smith (Sciences po Bordeaux )
Assistant Editor
Irina Andriamanana
2007-2009 EUSA Executive Committee
Liesbet Hooghe, Chair (UNC Chapel Hill)
Neil Fligstein, Vice-Chair
(University of California, Berkeley)
Amy Verdun, Secretary (University of Victoria)
Frank Schimmelfennig, Treasurer
(ETH-Zurich)
Erik Jones (Johns Hopkins University)
R. Daniel Kelemen (Rutgers University)
Craig Parsons (University of Oregon)
Alberta Sbragia (University of Pittsburgh)
Ex Officio
Immediate Past Chair (2005-2007)
John T.S. Keeler (University of Pittsburgh)
European Union Studies Association ®
415 Bellefield Hall
University of Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh, PA 15260  USA
Web www.eustudies.org ®
E-mail eusa@pitt.edu
Telephone 412.648.7635
EUSA Review
Fritz Scharpf: 2007 Award for Lifetime
Contribution to the Field of EU Studies
FROM HIS EARLY WORK through his most recent articles
(e.g., “The European Social Model: Coping with the
Challenges of Diversity” (JCMS, 2002), Scharpf has
arguably done more than any other scholar of his
generation to illuminate the implications of European
integration for both democracy and social welfare.
And given that he has produced one book and eleven
articles since his “retirement” in 2003, scholars in
our field can no doubt look forward to continued
groundbreaking work from Professor Scharpf. Be-
low we have reproduced the text of a lecture deliv-
ered at the EUSA Tenth Biennial International Con-
ference in Montreal, Canada (May 17-May 19, 2007).
Reflections on Multilevel Legitimacy
Fritz W. Scharpf
THIS AWARD CAME as a totally unexpected surprise. But
since the news came a year and a half ago, I merci-
fully had a bit of time to recover from the shock. I am
of course overawed by the honor of having been cho-
sen, and I still have not been able to convince myself
that I deserve it. But then, I am also humble enough
to ask - who am I to say that this illustrious body has
chosen wrong?
In any case, I am immensely grateful for the
honor - and even more for its official designation.
Getting a lifetime achievement award, whether justi-
fied or not, conveys a clear message: It says, your
work is over. Your achievements or failures have been
recorded. You may now go playing - with your grand-
son, with your photography, or anything else. But as
far as serious scholarly work goes, you are done. As
you may imagine, I find this message enormously
liberating. And I try to guard as best as I can against
the temptation to continue in the old tracks - to do
what I did before, just less and less, from one year to
the next.
Democracy and Multilevel Polities
Nevertheless, there is also this nagging sense of
some unfinished business, or the unrealistic hope
that some issues with which I have struggled so long
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might still be clarified a bit more by some kind of “con-
cluding remarks”. Among these is the relationship be-
tween democratic legitimacy and multilevel government.
I have worked on both, off and on, ever since I started
out as a political scientist in the late 1960s. But I never
did focus systematically on the relationship between
the two.
In my work on multilevel policy making in German
federalism, that relationship played only a marginal role
- and I think for good reasons. In Germany, parliamen-
tary democracy is institutionalized at both levels, na-
tional and regional. But German politics is so much fo-
cused on the national arena that Länder elections (which
directly shape the party-political profile of the federal
second chamber) have mostly become “second order
national elections” - with the consequence of increas-
ing the pressures of democratic accountability on the
national government. Political scientists, it is true, tend
to worry about the lack of political transparency under
conditions of the “joint-decision trap”, since the respon-
sibility for national policy choices is shared among the
federal majority and Länder prime ministers. But since
dissatisfied voters are not obliged to be fair when they
punish a government, blame avoidance is not a very
promising strategy in German politics. So while I could
talk about many things that are wrong with German fed-
eralism, a lack of political responsiveness to voter dis-
satisfaction would not be on my short list.
In my work on Europe, democratic legitimacy does
indeed play a role (Scharpf 1999). I have no reason to
retract anything that I have written on the subject - and
I certainly will not bore you with a restatement. But I
acknowledge that readers may have found my norma-
tive arguments somewhat inconclusive - and I tend to
agree. The reason, I suggest, is that my arguments - in
common with most of the literature - were focused on
the European level, rather than on the implications of
the multilevel characteristics of the European polity.
By focusing exclusively on the legitimacy of gov-
erning at the European level, we are tempted to refer to
criteria that are also employed in defining the legitimacy
of the democratic nation state. And once the issue is
framed in these terms, we are inevitably involved in a
comparative evaluation - which, depending on our meta-
theoretical preferences, can then be conducted in a
critical or affirmative spirit.
In the critical mood, we will emphasize everything
that European political structures and processes lack
in comparison to (usually highly idealized) models of
democratic constitutionalism at national levels (e.g.,
Greven and Pauly 2000; Follesdal and Hix 2006). The
arguments, running from the fundamental to the more
contingent, are too familiar to require elaboration: The
lack of a European “demos” or of a “thick” collective
identity, the lack of a common political space, the lack
of a common language and of Europe-wide media of
political communication, the lack of a political infrastruc-
ture of Europe-wide political parties, the absence of
Europe-wide political competition, the low political sa-
lience of elections to the European Parliament, the lim-
its of EP competencies, and hence the lack of parlia-
mentary or electoral accountability for European acts
of government. In short, the European democratic defi-
cit exists and it cannot be repaired in the foreseeable
future.
In the affirmative mood, by contrast, we will empha-
size features where the EU compares favorably to a
more realistic view of political structures and processes
in real-existing member states (e.g., Majone 1998;
Moravcsik 2002). Institutional checks and balances at
the European level are more elaborate and provide more
protection against potential abuses of governing pow-
ers than is true in most member states. Moreover, many
of the governing functions of the EU belong to a cat-
egory which, even in the most democratic member
states, is exempted from direct political accountability.
On the other hand, explicitly political EU policies con-
tinue to depend on the agreement of democratically
accountable national governments in the Council and
on majorities in the increasingly powerful European
Parliament. At the same time, EU institutions are likely
to provide more open access to a wider plurality of or-
ganized interests than is true of most member govern-
ments. In short, the alleged deficit of democratic legiti-
macy exists mainly in the eyes of its academic behold-
ers.
As you may have guessed, in my view, many of the
arguments on either side have considerable prima-fa-
cie support in empirical and normative terms, but most
of them are also vulnerable to empirical and normative
challenges. Moreover, they are not generally in direct
contradiction of each other, but tend to be located on
different dimensions of a political property space - so
that even in the case of empirical agreement the pluses
and minuses could not be aggregated in a single evalu-
ative metric. This may explain the ambivalence of my
own arguments, and it surely must also affect the evalu-
ation of EU legitimacy by other authors who are not ex-
ante committed to either a critical or an affirmative po-
sition.
Legitimacy - Functional, Normative and Empirical
What I now want to add to this re-interpretation is
the intuition that the ambiguities could be reduced,
though not overcome altogether, if discussions of politi-
cal legitimacy in the European polity were explicitly lo-
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cated in a multilevel framework. To make my point how-
ever, I also need to distinguish among three perspec-
tives on political legitimacy - the functional, the norma-
tive, and the empirical.1
In my view, the functional perspective is basic in the
sense that it must also provide the reference for con-
cepts of normative and empirical legitimacy. It ad-
dresses the fundamental problem of political systems -
to find acceptance of exercises of governing authority
that run against the interests or preferences of the gov-
erned (Luhmann 1969, 27-37). Such acceptance may
be motivated by an expectation of effective controls and
sanctions, or by widely shared (and hence socially sta-
bilized) beliefs that imply a moral obligation to comply.
Both motives may or may not coexist. But in political
systems that cannot also count on voluntary compli-
ance based on normative legitimating beliefs, effective
government would depend entirely on extensive and very
expensive behavior controls and sanctions, and per-
haps also on the repression of dissent and opposition.
In other words, legitimacy is a functional prerequisite of
efficient and liberal forms of government.
In the normative perspective, therefore, political phi-
losophy and public discourses will propose and criti-
cize arguments that could support an obligation to obey
under conditions where compliance would violate the
actor’s interests and could be evaded at low costs. In
modern, Western polities, such legitimating arguments
tend to focus on institutional arrangements ensuring
democratic participation, the accountability of governors
and safeguards against abuses of governing powers.
From an empirical perspective, finally, what mat-
ters is the compliance with exercises governing author-
ity that is based on legitimating beliefs, rather than on
threats and sanctions. The focus of empirical research
may thus be either on beliefs or directly on compliance
behavior. In both cases, however, empirical findings will
encounter problems of theoretical validity. In the first
case, the notoriously loose coupling between professed
beliefs and actual behavior should make us hesitate to
put too much weight on Eurobarometer data about gen-
eral support for, or trust in, EU and national institutions.2
By contrast, empirical indicators of actual compliance
behavior might be caused by the fear of effective sanc-
tions as well as by string legitimating beliefs. That would
be less of a problem with data about non-sanctioned
political behavior expressing greater or lesser support
for governing authority. Thus falling electoral participa-
tion rates, rising electoral volatility, more rapid govern-
ment turnover, a rise of radical or system-critical politi-
cal parties, and a growing incidence of violent protest
could be taken as valid indicators of declining political
legitimacy. But since legitimacy should sustain actual
compliance even in the absence of effective enforce-
ment, one might also interpret increasing tax evasion,
corruption and rising crime rates as indicators of de-
clining political legitimacy.
If we now try to make use of these perspectives in
evaluating political legitimacy in the multilevel European
polity, it is clear that normative criteria can be discussed
by reference to either the European or the national level.
In the empirical perspective, however, the situation is
different. While public-opinion data may include ques-
tions referring to both levels, the quality of the responses
and their causal significance remain dubious at best.
Information on the behavioral indicators, by contrast,
which would be of obvious causal relevance, seems to
be available only for national polities. Worse yet, it
seems practically impossible to define behavioral pat-
terns from which theoretically valid inferences on the
greater or lesser acceptance of the Union’s governing
authority could be derived. Upon reflection, the reason
appears clear: The EU does not have to face the em-
pirical tests of political legitimacy because it is shielded
against the behavioral responses of the governed by
the specific multilevel characteristics of the European
polity.
In contrast to federalism in the United States (where
the national government has its own administrative and
judicial infrastructure at regional and local levels), prac-
tically all EU policies must be implemented by the mem-
ber states. Yet in contrast to German federalism (where
most national legislation is implemented by the Länder
and communes), political attention and political com-
petition in Europe are not concentrated on the higher
(i.e., European) level. European elections are not
instrumentalized by political parties to shape European
policy choices, and they are not perceived by disaffected
voters as an opportunity to punish the EU government.
In short, with very few exceptions (mainly where the
Commission may prosecute business firms for a viola-
tion of competition rules), the EU does not have to con-
front the subjects of its governing authority, neither di-
rectly on the street nor indirectly at the ballot box.
Instead, it is national governments who must enact
and enforce European legislation. In the BSE scare that
had been badly mishandled by the EU (Vos 2000), it
was they who had to slaughter and destroy hundreds
of thousands of healthy cows when EU rules did not
allow the export of meat from herds that were inocu-
lated against BSE - and of course it was they who had
to call out the police when protesters tried to block the
massacre. As a consequence, two national ministers
had to resign in reaction to rising voter dissatisfaction3
- just as national governments must generally pay the
electoral price if voters are frustrated with the effects of
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EU rules on food standards, state aids, public procure-
ment, service liberalization, takeover rules or university
admissions.
By contrast, the EU is not directly affected either by
an erosion of political support or by an erosion of volun-
tary compliance among the target population of its gov-
erning authority. Since that is so, it is essentially cor-
rect to say that in relation to private citizens, the empiri-
cal legitimacy of the EU’s governing authority depends
entirely on the legitimacy resources of its member
states.
Two Normative Implications
From a normative perspective, this empirical con-
clusion has two major implications. The first is that the
legitimacy of the EU cannot, and need not, be judged
by reference to criteria and institutional conditions that
are appropriate for judging democratic nation states. It
is true, as EU lawyers do not cease to emphasize, that
the direct effect of EU law has bestowed directly en-
forceable rights on firms and individuals - first economic
rights and now even citizenship rights. Yet if the func-
tion of legitimacy is to motivate compliance with undes-
ired obligations, what matters for the EU is the compli-
ance of governments, parliaments, administrative agen-
cies and courts within member states - which, inciden-
tally, has always been the focus of empirical compli-
ance research, including the one that just received
EUSA’s best-book award (Falkner et al. 2005; see also,
Börzel et al. 2007).
Empirically, therefore, the EU is best understood
as a government of governments, rather than a gov-
ernment of citizens. In that role, moreover, it is extremely
dependent on voluntary compliance. Unlike national
governments which can and do reinforce normative
obligations with the threat of effective and potentially
very drastic enforcement measures, the EU has no
enforcement machinery which it could employ against
member governments: no army, no police force, no jails
- even the fines which the Court may impose in Treaty
violation proceedings could not be collected against
determined opposition.
If that is acknowledged, the normative discussion
of EU legitimacy should also focus primarily on the re-
lationship between the Union and its member states
and on the normative arguments that could oblige their
governments to comply with undesired EU rules. Now
if the same question were asked in the German multi-
level polity, a sufficient answer would point to the supe-
rior input legitimacy of political processes at the national
level. Länder governments refusing to comply with fed-
eral legislation would thus violate the principles of popu-
lar sovereignty and representative democracy. Since the
same answer could not be given for the EU, consider-
ations of output legitimacy would necessarily have
greater weight here.4
From the perspective of member governments it
would thus be relevant to ask in what ways and to what
extent membership in the European Union increases
or reduces their capacity to ensure peace and security
and to improve the welfare of the societies for which
they are responsible? If national discourses about Eu-
ropean legitimacy were framed in these terms, much
of the present sense of malaise might evaporate.5
My main concern, however, is with the second im-
plication of the multilevel perspective on political legiti-
macy. If the Union depends so completely on its mem-
ber states, then the potential effects of EU membership
on their legitimacy should also have a place in norma-
tive analyses. These effects may be positive or nega-
tive. Most important among the positive effects is surely
the maintenance of peaceful relations among European
nations which, for centuries, had been mortal enemies.
At the same time, European integration helped to stabi-
lize the transition to democracy, first in West Germany
and perhaps also in Italy, then in Greece, Portugal and
Spain, and then again in the Central and Eastern Euro-
pean accession states (Judt 2005).
More generally, one should think that the EU is
strengthening the political legitimacy of its member
states because it is dealing with problems that could no
longer be resolved at national levels. While this argu-
ment has analytical merit, it is surprisingly difficult to
substantiate empirically.6  In any case, moreover, it would
need to be balanced against the possibility that many of
the problems with which member states now must cope
have been created by European integration in the first
place, and that these may weaken political legitimacy
at the national level (Bartolini 2005). It is these possibili-
ties to which I will now turn.
European Constraints on the Political Legitimacy
of Member States
There is no question that the EU is imposing tight
constraints on the capacity for autonomous political
action of its member states - in monetary policy, in fis-
cal policy, in economic policy and in an increasing range
of other policy areas. But to think that these constraints
could undermine political legitimacy at the national level
seems still a surprising proposition. Given the central
role of national governments not only as “masters of
the treaties” and as unanimous decision-makers in the
second and third pillars, but also in legislation by the
“Community Method” in the first pillar, in Comitology and
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in the Open Method of Coordination, one ought to think
that these constraints are mostly self-imposed, and
probably for good economic and political reasons
(Garrett 1992; Moravcsik 1998; Moravcsik and
Sangiovanni 2003); in other words, volenti non fit iniuria?
This is a fair argument as far as it goes. But it doesn’t
go very far for two reasons. First, the argument applies
only to the “political modes” of EU policy making in
which the governments of member states have a con-
trolling role, but it does not apply to the “non-political
modes” in which the Commission, the Court and the
European Central Bank are able to impose policy
choices without any involvement of member govern-
ments or the European Parliament, for that matter
(Scharpf 2000). I will return to that in a moment.
Moreover, even for political choices, the argument
holds only the first time around, when the EU is writing
on a clean slate. In that case, unanimity or very high
consensus requirements will indeed prevent the adop-
tion of policies that would violate politically salient inter-
ests in member states. And if no agreement is reached,
national capabilities - whatever they may amount to -
will remain unimpaired. But once the slate is no longer
clean, these same consensus requirements will lose
their benign character. Now existing EU rules - whether
adopted by political or nonpolitical modes - are extremely
hard to change in response to changed circumstances
or changed political preferences. European law will thus
remain in place even if many or most member states
and a majority in Parliament would not now adopt it.
This constraint may be felt most acutely by recent ac-
cession states who had to accept the huge body of ex-
isting European law as a condition of their member-
ship, and who have little or no hope of later changing
those parts of the acquis that do not fit their own condi-
tions or preferences.
What matters even more here, however, is how the
high consensus requirements of the political modes
increase the autonomy and the power of EU policy
making in the non-political modes (Tsebelis 2002, chap-
ter 10). In the case of the European Central Bank, it is
true, the impotence of politically accountable actors was
brought about intentionally (though perhaps unwisely)
by the governments negotiating over the Monetary Union.
The same cannot be said, however, for the non-politi-
cal policy-making powers of the Commission and the
Court.
Of course, the Court’s responsibility to interpret the
law of the Treaty and secondary European law was also
established intentionally, and so were the Commission’s
mandate to prosecute, and the Court’s powers to pun-
ish Treaty violations. What was not originally foreseen,
however, was the boldness with which the Court would
establish the doctrines claiming “direct effect” and “su-
premacy” for European law (DeWitte 1999; Alter 2001)
- and how these would then allow it to enforce its spe-
cific interpretation of very general Treaty commitments.
What also could not have been known in advance is
how the potential range of the Court’s powers of inter-
pretation could be strategically exploited by the Com-
mission if and when it would choose to initiate Treaty
violation proceedings against a member state - and how
successful prosecutions against some governments
would then be used to change the political balance in
the Council in favor of directives proposed by the Com-
mission which otherwise would not have been supported
by a qualified majority (Schmidt 2000).
Moreover, the substantive range of judicial legisla-
tion is greatly extended by the fact that its exercise is
practically immune to attempts at political correction. If
the Court’s decision is based on an interpretation of the
Treaty, it could only be overturned by an amendment
that must be ratified in all twenty-seven member states.
Given the extreme heterogeneity of national interests
and political preferences, that is not an eventuality that
the Commission and the Court need to worry about.
Nor is the situation very different for interpretations of
secondary EU law. In fact, the inevitable compromises
among national interests favor vague and ambivalent
formulations in EU regulations and directives that are
effectively invitations to judicial specification. Attempts
at political correction would then depend upon an initia-
tive of the Commission and the support of qualified
majorities in the Council, and if the Council should wish
to change the Commission’s proposal, it could only do
so through a unanimous decision. As a consequence,
the potential for judicial legislation is greater in the EU
than under any national constitution.
Negative Integration and Empirical Legitimacy?
But why should one think that the non-political pow-
ers of the Commission and the Court could interfere
with the political legitimacy of EU member states? A
general argument might point to the inevitable loss of
national autonomy and control and the reduced domain
of democratically accountable governing. Instead, I wish
to present a narrower argument that focuses on a spe-
cific vulnerability of national political legitimacy to the
rules of negative integration that are being promoted by
judicial legislation.
 On the first point, I return to the distinction between
normative and empirical perspectives on legitimacy. In
normative discourses, the focus is on the vertical rela-
tionship between governors and the governed. What
matters are institutional arrangements ensuring, on the
one hand, responsive government and political account-
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ability and preventing, on the other hand, the abuse of
governing powers through the protection of human rights
and the rule of law. At the empirical level as well, trust in
the effectiveness of these vertical safeguards must play
a significant role in legitimacy beliefs.
But that is not all. Voluntary compliance also has a
horizontal dimension in which individual subjects will
respond to perceptions of each others’ non-compliance.
In game-theoretic terms, this relationship can be mod-
eled as an n-person prisoners’ dilemma in which com-
pliance must erode in response to information about
unsanctioned noncompliance (Rapoport 1970). This
theoretical intuition is confirmed by empirical research
on tax evasion (Levi 1988), or on the survival or decline
of cooperative institutions (Ostrom 1990), as well as by
experimental research (Fehr and Fischbacher 2002) -
all of which demonstrate that voluntary compliance with
rules, whether imposed or agreed-upon, does indeed
erode as a consequence of perceived non-compliance.
Why should I remain law-abiding if others are allowed
to get away scot-free? Hence we must assume that
effective legitimating beliefs will also include expecta-
tions of a basic mutuality and fairness among citizens
and of a basic reciprocity between the consumption of
public goods and the obligation to contribute to their pro-
duction (Rothstein 1998). It is these expectations which
are vulnerable to the removal of national boundaries
through negative integration (Scharpf 1999, chapter 2).
Even in the original EEC Treaty, governments had
signed sweeping commitments to negative economic
integration. Customs duties and quantitative restrictions
to free trade and “all measures having equivalent ef-
fect” were to be prohibited, obstacles to the free move-
ment of persons, services and capital should be abol-
ished, undistorted competition in the internal market was
to be ensured, and any discrimination on grounds of
nationality was to be ruled out. In the original under-
standing, however, these were political commitments
whose more precise meaning and reach would in due
course be spelled out through further negotiations
among governments and through political legislation at
the European level - and whose consequences could
be controlled through re-regulation at the European level.
Under the unanimity rule, however, political progress
toward market integration was slow. Beginning in the
early 1970s, therefore, the Court began to give direct
effect to these Treaty commitments. But given the in-
trinsic limitations of judicial power, it could only strike
down national regulations that impeded free trade and
free movement, but it could not itself re-regulate the
underlying problems at the European level. The result-
ing asymmetry was only somewhat reduced when the
Single European Act introduced the possibility of quali-
fied majority voting in the Council for regulations imple-
menting the Internal Market program. Where conflicts
of interest among member states are politically salient,
European regulations can still be blocked very easily,
whereas judicial legislation continues to extend the reach
of negative integration (Weiler 1999).
This asymmetry of negative and positive integra-
tion has effects that may undermine expectations of
reciprocity at the national level. Now capital owners may
evade or avoid income and inheritance taxes by mov-
ing their assets to Luxembourg; firms may relocate pro-
duction to low-cost countries without reducing their ac-
cess to home markets; local service providers may be
replaced by competitors producing under the regula-
tions and wages prevailing in their home country; na-
tional firms may avoid paying the “tax-price” for their
use of public infrastructure by creating financing sub-
sidiaries in member states with the lowest taxes on prof-
its; and by the latest series of ECJ decisions, compa-
nies are allowed to evade national rules of corporate
governance by creating a letter-box parent company in
a low-regulation member state. Many of these examples,
and the list could easily be extended, can be interpreted
as a consequence of neo-liberal and free-trade eco-
nomic preferences in the Internal-Market and Competi-
tion directories of the Commission and on the Court
(Gerber 1994; Höpner and Schäfer 2007).7
But this motive alone can no longer explain the full
range of Court-imposed rules of negative integration. A
dramatic recent example is provided by a decision strik-
ing down, as discrimination on accounts of nationality,
an Austrian regulation of admissions to medical educa-
tion that had required applicants from abroad to show
that they could also have been admitted in their home
country (C-147/03, 01/20/2005). The Austrian rule had
tried to deal with the disproportionate inflow of applica-
tions from Germany, where admissions are restricted
by stringent numerus-clausus requirements - and when
it was voided by the Court, the proportion of applicants
from Germany rose to 60 percent in some Austrian uni-
versities. In response, Austria passed a new rule limit-
ing admissions from abroad to 25 percent of the total -
against which the Commission again initiated Treaty
violation proceedings that are presently on their way to
the Court.
As an exercise in legal craftsmanship, the decision
seems surprisingly weak: It is based on Article 12 of the
EC Treaty - which, however, does not prohibit discrimi-
nation on grounds of nationality per se, but only “within
the scope of application of this Treaty”. Yet, nothing in
the present Treaty, (nor even in the draft Constitutional
Treaty - Art. III – 282), empowers the Union to regulate
university admissions. Instead, Articles 3 and 149, to
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which the Court referred, merely authorize the Com-
munity to make “a contribution to education” (Art 3, 1
EC) and to “encourage mobility of students and teach-
ers” (Art. 149, 2 EC) - but with the explicit proviso that
such actions should be limited to recommendations by
the Council and to “incentive measures, excluding any
harmonization of the laws and regulations of member
states” (Art. 149, 2 and 4 EC). In other words: the “mas-
ters of the treaty” have ruled out EU legislation that could
regulate admissions to member states’ universities.
Moreover, these restrictions were explicitly intro-
duced in the Maastricht Treaty to limit the expansion of
the EU’s role in education. Yet the Court merely cited
its own pre-Maastricht precedent (193/83, 13/02/1985)
that had had no textual basis in the Treaty, to assert
that access to vocational education was within the
scope of the Treaty. Apart from the arrogance with which
political corrections of judicial legislation are ignored
here, the decision appears remarkable for its completely
one-sided concern with maximizing educational mobil-
ity and (in contrast to the legal situation among the
American states) in ruling out any preference for resi-
dents of the country where the taxes are raised that
finance higher education. This is like saying that the EU
entitles you to claim access to a dues-financed club
even if you (or your family) are not assuming the bur-
dens of membership. Similarly, there is no concern for
the structural problems Austrian medical education and
medical practice will face, if half or more of the avail-
able places will go to students from abroad that are
most likely to leave the country after graduation.8
This is a remarkable position which, as I said, is not
logically connected to the free-market fundamentalism
that may explain liberalization decisions in other areas.
Instead, it must be seen as the expression of a more
general pro-integration bias that treats any progress in
mobility, non-discrimination and the removal of national
obstacles to integration as an unmitigated good and an
end in itself. In this regard, the case is by no means
unique. As Dorte Sindbjerg Martinsen has shown in a
fascinating series of papers, the same pro-integration
bias has also been driving the case law that is progres-
sively removing the boundaries shielding national wel-
fare systems.9  Its intensity is revealed by the variety of
Treaty bases which the Court invoked to move forward
in the same direction from one case to the next - relying
sometimes on the protection of migrant workers, some-
times on the freedom of service provision, sometimes
on non-discrimination and sometimes on the new chap-
ter on “citizenship of the Union”. Moreover, when gov-
ernments managed, by unanimous decision in the
Council, to force the Court to retreat on one front, the
ground was recovered a few years later by decisions
relying on another Treaty base (Martinsen 2003; 2005a;
2005b; 2005c; 2007).
This quasi-unconditional preference for more inte-
gration through the removal of national boundaries has
consistently characterized the policies proposed by the
Commission and enacted by the Court. Their prefer-
ence is widely shared by academic specialists in Euro-
pean law who not only admire, and contribute to, the
evolution of a largely autonomous legal system (Craig
and de Búrca 1999), but also praise the functional ef-
fectiveness of  “integration through law” under condi-
tions where political integration has been weak (Weiler
1982; Cappelletti et al. 1985). Nearly the same admira-
tion is evident in political science studies of the judicial
edifice (Alter 2001; Stone Sweet 2004) and, more gen-
erally, in the way Europeanists in the social sciences
view the “constitutionalization“ of the European polity -
whether achieved through “stealth” and “subterfuge” or
through explicit political action (Héritier 1999; Rittberger
and Schimmelfennig 2006).
This pro-integration bias, I hasten to add, is most
plausible and respectable, considering the horrors of
our nationalistic pasts and the manifold benefits that
we derive from the progress toward an “ever closer
Union”. But as long as the asymmetry between political
immobilism and judicial activism persists, progress is
mainly achieved by non-political action, which - since
the judicial power to destroy far exceeds its capacity to
create - is bound to favor negative integration. The mere
removal of national boundaries, however, is likely to
deepen the split between the mobile and the immobile
classes in our societies, and between the beneficiaries
of integration and those who have to pay its costs in
terms unemployment, lower wages and higher taxes
on the immobile segments of the tax base. If left un-
checked, the split is dangerous for member states if it
undermines the sense of mutuality and reciprocity at
the empirical base of national legitimacy. And it is dan-
gerous for the Union if it weakens the willingness or the
ability of member states to maintain the voluntary com-
pliance on which the viability of European integration
continues to depend.
So What Could Be Done?
To summarize, a multilevel perspective on legitimacy
in the European polity suggests a change of emphasis
in current normative and empirical discussions. As long
as the EU is able to rely on the voluntary compliance of
its member states, the alleged European Democratic
Deficit loses much of its salience. Instead, the struc-
tural asymmetry between the immobilism of political,
and the activism of non-political modes of EU policy-
making appears more worrying. Moreover, there is a
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danger that the unrestrained  pursuit of economic and
legal integration may weaken the political legitimacy of
member states and endanger the voluntary compliance
of governments with EU rules that violate salient na-
tional interests.
But it is difficult to see how this danger might be
avoided. There is apparently no way of persuading the
Commission and the Court to use their non-controllable
power in a more balanced way that would give more
weight to the national problems that are created by the
inexorable progress of negative integration. So if judi-
cial self-restraint cannot be counted upon, one should
seek ways to increase the European capacity for politi-
cal action. Given the high consensus requirements and
the heterogeneity of national interests in EU 27, how-
ever, that seems a remote possibility. I am also deeply
skeptical of proposals to invigorate the political modes
of EU policy-making through political mobilization and
the politicization of EU policy choices (Follesdal and
Hix 2006; Zürn 2006). I agree with Stefano Bartolini
(2005) that the most likely outcome, under present in-
stitutional rules, would be increased conflict and even
less capacity for political action - as well as frustration
and increased alienation among disappointed citizens.
And, for reasons explained elsewhere (Scharpf 1999) I
would be even more skeptical of institutional reforms
that would reduce the veto power of the Council in favor
of majority rule in the European Parliament.
Instead, one might think of creating a defense for
politically salient national concerns that avoids the dis-
ruptive consequences of open noncompliance and that
does not depend on the good will of the Commission
and the Court. A while ago I suggested that this could
be achieved through a form of politically controlled opt-
outs (Scharpf 2006). Member states could then ask the
Council to be exempted, in a specific case, from a par-
ticular EU rule which their view would violate highly sa-
lient national interests. I still think this would be a good
idea: the Council could be counted upon to prevent opt-
outs at the expense of other member states, but in the
absence of significant externalities it would also have
more sympathy with the plight of a fellow government
than could be expected from the Commission or the
Court. At the same time, the prospect that one could
later apply for an opt-out might facilitate agreement in
the Council on new EU legislation and thus strengthen
the political modes of EU policy-making. As far as I know,
however, this idea has not found any takers.
So I must leave it at that. I certainly cannot say that
I have a solution. Yet I am persuaded that there is in-
deed an important problem - on which, as we used to
say, much research remains to be done. I look forward
to watching it from the sidelines.
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Notes
1
 Hurrelmann (2007) also proposes a multilevel framework,
and he also focuses on “normative” and “empirical legitimacy”.
Since he pays no attention to the functional perspective, how-
ever, his operationalization of empirical legitimacy differs from
mine.
2 Hurrelmann (2007) shares these reservations and relies
on comments in the quality press instead. This choice per-
mits more differentiated analyses, but is even further removed
from compliance behavior.
3
 See Imort (2001). Germany had committed to destroy
400 000 cows, but after violent protests of animal-protection
groups (and some recovery of the beef market) only 80000
cows were ultimately killed. A play-by-play chronicle of the
EUSA Review    Summer 2007   11
EU as a Global Actor
Interest Section Essay
BSE crisis in Germany is provided in
h t t p : / / w w w . n e t d o k t o r . d e / f e a t u r e / b s e /
creutzfeldt_jakob_chronik.htm.
4
 Hurrelmann (2007) found that evaluations of the EU in
the German and British quality press also emphasized out-
put-oriented criteria.
5 On the crucial importance of national discourses about
the EU for legitimacy at both levels, see Schmidt (2006, chap-
ter 5).
6 There is reason to think that political legitimacy in rela-
tively poor accession states was strengthened by the high
rates of economic growth that could be achieved through a
combination of European subsidies with unconstrained tax
and wage competition. By contrast, the economic benefits of
integration for the Union as a whole appear much more doubt-
ful (Ziltener 2002; Bornschier et al. 2004).
7 On the basic affinity between multi-level governance and
neoliberal policy preferences, see Harmes (2006).
8
 Apparently, Austria has a shortage of doctors as well as
a perceived general need to expand its university education in
spite of tight budget constraints. Having to introduce restric-
tive admissions examinations, as the court had suggested, in
order to contain the flood of German applicants would thus be
counterproductive.
9 See also the magisterial study by Maurizio Ferrera (2005)
which, however, is surprisingly optimistic about the possibility
of a re-creation of boundaries at the European level.
Fritz W. Scharpf is Professor and Emeritus Director of
the Max Planck Institute for the Studies of Societies in
Cologne Germany
EUSA Executive Committee
Election Results
A Review of EU Development Policy
Stephen J. H. Dearden
The EU’s role in the world development debate re-
ceives remarkably little academic attention despite the
Commission’s sole responsibility for trade negotiations
and the scale of its aid programme, where it has a
shared competence. Currently the EU is a major player
in the Doha Round of WTO trade negotiations and is
renegotiating its trade concessions with the African,
Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group of developing coun-
tries. In terms of aid, by 2005 assistance administered
directly by the European Commission (EC) totalled •6.1
bn., making the EC the third largest aid donor after Ja-
pan and the US. At the UN the Millennium Review Sum-
mit in 2005 the EU committed itself to achieving an Of-
ficial Development Assistance (ODA) target of 0.56%
of Gross National Income by 2010, with the EC’s own
budget for external actions increasing by 4.5 % per an-
num over the period 2007-2013.
The framework for EU development policy was re-
stated in the 2005 Policy Statement ‘European Con-
sensus on Development’ (EC 2005). Three ‘policies’ are
identified – the European Neighbourhood and Partner-
ship, Pre-accession and Development Cooperation -
and three ‘instruments’ - humanitarian, stability and
macro economic assistance.  Here I am going to con-
centrate only upon the development dimension. This
Statement built upon the initial ‘Statement on Develop-
ment Policy’ (EC 2000) and reiterated many of its ob-
jectives and commitments, but also reflected the
changes that had taken place in the intervening five
years.  In particular it placed an emphasis upon the Mil-
lennium Development Goal and made a qualified com-
mitment toprioritising assistance to low-income devel-
oping countries (LICs). The EC had been subject to
considerable criticism for its failure to direct a greater
percentage of its aid programmes to the LICs. In 2000
EC ODA to the LICs had fallen to only 32% of the total,
reflecting the EU’s focus upon the ‘near-abroad’ of the
Mediterranean and Central/Eastern Europe. By 2005
the share of the LIC had risen to 46% of EC aid. Admin-
istratively it reaffirmed a shift from project aid to general
budgetary support to the developing countries and to
performance-based assessment. Conditionality was to
be expressed in a ‘contract’ with the partner countries,
recognising that aid effectiveness can only be achieved
through ‘national ownership’ of aid  programmes by the
developing country.
The results of the recent EUSA Executive Com-
mittee election are in.  Neil Fligstein (University of
California, Berkeley), Erik Jones (Johns Hopkins
University), R. Daniel Kelemen (Rutgers Univer-
sity), and Craig Parsons (University of Oregon)
have been elected to serve on the Executive Com-
mittee for four year terms running from 2007 to
2011.
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The EC administered aid programme is composed
of two parts – the external actions element of the gen-
eral budget and the European Development Funds
(EDF). The Member States contributions to the latter
are separate from those to the general budget of the
EU despite the Fund being administered by the Com-
mission. The five year EDFs are the mechanism for
providing the aid dimension of the Partnership Conven-
tions with the ACP group of developing countries. These
Conventions (Yaoundé, Lomé and currently Cotonou)
have their origins in the colonial relations of the Mem-
ber States and now covers 79 developing countries.
The Conventions have both an aid and trade dimension
and placed an emphasis upon continuous political dia-
logue with a supporting institutional framework – a
unique feature in such international agreements. The
administrative innovations in aid delivery under the EDFs
have set the pattern for the EC’s approach to its rela-
tions with the non-ACP developing states under, for
example, the Mediterranean Barcelona process or in
individual Association Agreements. After the
organisational reforms of 2000 (EC 2000) DG Devel-
opment is responsible for aid policy and programming
for the ACP states, while DG Relex covers all other
developing countries. EuropeAid is responsible for the
implementation of these aid programmes. By 2005 of
the •6 bn. of aid payments, •2.5 bn (41%) was under
the EDF to the ACPs, 18% to Mediterranean countries,
10% to Asia and 5% to Latin America, with similar shares
to the Balkans and the Central/Eastern Europe.
Dissatisfaction with the results of the EU’s aid
programme and the changing international climate at
the end of the cold war led to a major review of the
existing Lomé Conventions. The new Cotonou Partner-
ship Agreement, signed in 2000, will run for 20 years,
double the length of all previous Conventions (for de-
tails see Salama and Dearden 2002). A total of •25 bn.
has been made available for the period 2000-2007, EDF
9 providing •13.5 bn. and the European Investment Bank
(EIB) •1.7 bn., and will increase to •22.6 bn. under
EDF10 for the years 2003-13. One of the major changes
under Cotonou has been the radical simplification of
aid instruments.  These are now provided under two
‘envelopes’ – grants (•11.3 bn.) and a loan Investment
Facility (•2.2 bn.) administered by the EIB. A particular
emphasis has now been placed upon the role of the
private sector in economic development, hence the cre-
ation of the substantial Investment Facility. Grants will
continue to be allocated under national and regional In-
dicative Programmes, based upon the preparation of
Country Support Strategies, but the EC will continue to
shift its emphasis from funding individual projects to
more general sectoral and budget support. For this to
succeed a much closer political dialogue will be required
between the EC and the governments of the recipient
countries. Cotonou continues the process begun un-
der Lomé IV where the funds allocated to an ACP are
subject to a process of rolling review, assessed both
for need and performance.  This assessment will in-
creasingly fall upon the local Delegations under the pro-
cess of decentralisation begun in 2000 with the admin-
istrative reforms.
The political dialogue with individual ACPs has in-
evitably become more intense as the EU has placed
increasing emphasis upon human rights, democracy
and the rule of law.  Under Cotonou these are regarded
as ‘essential elements’ whose infringement may lead
to the imposition of sanctions including the suspension
of aid.  In addition Cotonou includes reference to ‘good
governance’, which after opposition from the ACPs was
included as a separate ‘fundamental element’. Although
the sanction procedure is slightly different, failures in
the case of good governance can still result in the sus-
pension of the EC’s aid programme.  To overcome the
problems of failing ACP governments Cotonou also
placed an emphasis upon the potential role of non-state
actors. This includes local government, trade unions,
farmers’ organisations, local NGOs and the private sec-
tor.  To support their role in fostering good governance
and in service delivery the EC allocated substantial funds
to building their capacity.  Institution building, gender and
environment considerations were all identified in
Cotonou as ‘cross-cutting’ issues to be addressed
across all of the EC’s development initiatives.
Cotonou also included a significant change in the
trade concessions that were to be offered to the ACPs.
Under all previous Conventions the ACPs were granted
non-reciprocal tariff-free access to the EU market for
their manufactured exports and for most of their pri-
mary commodities, with the principal exception of a
number of CAP products; specific arrangements ex-
isted for bananas, run, beef and sugar under the Com-
modity Protocols.  After a successful challenge to its
banana regime before the WTO the EU required that
the Cotonou Agreement be WTO compatible through
adopting the principle of reciprocity.  While the WTO
allows non-reciprocal trade concessions to be offered
to low income developing countries the ACP group in-
cludes a number of middle income developing coun-
tries who would not qualify for such concessions.  Al-
though the EU has obtained a waiver from the WTO
this will expire in 2008, by which time the EU is expect-
ing the ACPs to have successfully negotiated Economic
Partnership Agreements (EPA)(see ODI June 2006).
These are being negotiated in regional groupings of the
ACPs and the intension is that these new agreements
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will be phased in over a twelve year period.  Although
the EU committed itself to ensuring that the ACP’s po-
sition would not be eroded by the move to EPAs this is
proving hard to reconcile with its objective of achieving
WTO compatibility.
The negotiations are proving difficult with serious
doubts as to whether they will be concluded by the end
of 2007, the EC’s intended deadline (for details of the
current state of negotiations see ‘Trade Negotiations
Insights’ on www.acp-eu-trade.org ). Problems have
arisen with some of the regional groupings that are un-
dertaking the negotiations, especially in Southern Af-
rica where there are existing customs unions. A further
difficulty arises from the EU’s “Everything-But-Arms”
(EBA) initiative which offers non-reciprocal tariff-free
access for all 48 low-income developing countries. For
the low-income ACPs the EPA will therefore offer little
in the way of trade preferences. For all of the ACPs the
reductions in tariffs under the successive rounds of the
WTO, and its predecessor the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), has gradually eroded the sig-
nificance of the EU’s tariff concessions and reduced
the value of any further tariff preferences available un-
der an EPA. For the ACPs the requirement to open up
their markets to EU exports represents a considerable
challenge. From the perspective of the EU the opening
up of their markets is driven by a belief that this will
make a major contribution to their economic develop-
ment rather than offering a significant market opportu-
nity for EU exporters. In most cases the ACPs remain
insignificant trading partners for the EU beyond a few
commodity producers such as Nigeria for oil. Only South
Africa is a major exporter of manufactured goods to the
EU and it is currently not eligible for non-reciprocal trade
preferences. Integration of the ACP states into the world
economy has always remained one of the stated ob-
jectives of EU development policy and opening up their
markets to international competition is regarded as of-
fering a major contribution to their development.
The negotiations are becoming dominated by a num-
ber of detailed issues. Phasing is likely to prove the least
contentious, with the ACPs expected to only be required
to reduce their tariffs towards the end of the transition
period. The ‘rules of origin’, which define whether goods
will qualify for duty free entry and reflect the local value-
added of the product, are a more problematic technical
issue (see ODI November 2006). There also remain
disagreements over the extent of the EPAs, in particu-
lar whether they should extend beyond trade in goods
to include the trade in services, investment protection,
competition policy, public procurement etc. These are
often referred to as the ‘Singapore issues’ in the con-
text of the currently stalled Doha Round of the WTO.
The WTO negotiations and those for the EPA remain
interrelated. The WTO provides the legal framework for
the EPA and issues such as the requirement that reci-
procity must cover ‘substantially all trade’ is an impor-
tant area for interpretation. For the EU this has been
defined as requiring tariff free access for 80% of trade.
Changes in the approach to the developing countries
would inevitably have changed the compatibility require-
ments in an EPA. The WTO negotiations, intended as
a ‘development round’, were expected to pay particular
attention to the needs of the developing countries
through ‘special and differential treatment’. Indeed the
Doha Round negotiations are in many ways more sig-
nificant for the ACPs than the EPA. The opening up of
the EU market to their primary products, currently re-
stricted in many cases under the CAP, offers some
ACPs significant export potential. However not all ACPs
would be beneficiaries as the Commodity Protocols
offered a relative preference over other  non-EU suppli-
ers at EU guaranteed prices. However the future of the
Commodity Protocols has been on question for some
time, with only the Sugar Protocol of any significance
and this is currently under review. Of more significance
has been the undertaking of the EU to phase out its
agricultural export subsidies, although the failure of both
the EU and US to commit to reducing their domestic
agricultural subsidies is the principal cause of the cur-
rent impasse.
Any EPA, as well as being likely to require signifi-
cant economic structural adjustment in most ACPs in
the face of EU competition, will also erode their tax base,
given their financial dependence upon customs duties.
The ACPs have therefore attempted to link any EPA to
additional EU aid. This the EU has strongly resisted,
asserting that the allocations under EDF10 have already
been decided. However the EU has shown its willing-
ness to discuss ‘Trade Related Assistance’ (TRA) to
support the adoption of an EPA. In 2005 the EU’s Coun-
cil agreed that the Member States would strive to col-
lectively increase their TRA to •1 bn. per annum by 2010
which, combined with the EC’s own allocation, would
take TRA to •2 bn. per annum.
Attention has also turned to the alternatives that the
EU might offer to the ACPs in the case of the failure of
the EPA negotiations. The alternative developing coun-
tries trade preference regime is that of the General Sys-
tem of Preferences (GSP). This EU variant of a global
concession scheme has proved highly discriminatory
over its lifetime, trade concessions being withdrawn
from countries and products that have been particu-
larly successful in penetrating the EU market. Indeed
the scheme included a ‘graduation mechanism’ exclud-
ing specific country products depending upon the
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country’s level of industrialisation and ‘export
specialisation’. The current GSP covers 7,200 products
from 179 countries with the major beneficiaries being
India, China and Brazil. But, in addition a ‘GSP-plus’
has been offered to ‘dependent and vulnerable’ coun-
tries. This is of particular interest to the ACPs since this
is the most likely alternative trade regime to the EPA for
those not qualifying for the EBA. To qualify for GSP-
plus countries must ratify 23 international Conventions
covering such areas as human rights and labour stan-
dards and be particularly export dependent. So far only
15 countries have qualified for GSP-plus.
In the WTO negotiations the EU’s position is heavily
influenced by its domestic agricultural lobby and hence
is very much related to the issue of CAP reform. It must
also be recognised that in the EPA negotiations in par-
ticular areas, for example fisheries, the EU is pursuing
its own economic interests. Nonetheless both at the
WTO and in the EPA negotiations there is a genuinely
held view that the reciprocal opening up of developing
country markets will make a significant contribution to
their economic development.  The reduction of tariff
protection and their integration into the world economy
is seen is a driver of the essential structural change
necessary for sustained economic growth.
Aside from the issues of broad policy attention also
needs to be paid to the administrative and organisational
performance of the EC. ‘Policy evaporation’, the gap
between official policy rhetoric and the reality of deliv-
ery, can only be understood within the context of the
evolving approach to the EC’s organisation and admin-
istration. This has been subject to considerable change
over the last decade (see Dearden 2006), from the cre-
ation of EuropeAid to the adoption of a common frame-
work for country assessment and programming through
the adoption of Country Strategy Papers (CSP). A num-
ber of issues remain unresolved or the outcomes of
reform uncertain.   ‘Deconcentration’, combined with
the move to general budget support, will place a signifi-
cant additional burden upon local Delegations and will
require them to extend their role beyond ‘auditing’ to that
of policy analysis. Their relationship to Brussels in this
process remains uncertain – e.g. how far they will have
local discretion in their approach or their influence upon
formulating broad Brussels policy through ‘feedback’.
At the same time the evolution of an EU ‘diplomatic ser-
vice’ under the recently proposed ‘Treaty Amendments’
may provide the necessary enhancement of their role
in the developing world for these changes to be suc-
cessful.
Some elements of the EC’s approach to aid admin-
istration are simply constrained by the lack of an estab-
lished robust methodology. Thus problems have con-
tinued to be faced in integrating the cross-cutting is-
sues – gender equality, environment, children’s and in-
digenous peoples’ rights and HIV/AIDS - into aid pro-
gramming. Similarly enhancing the poverty focus of EC
aid policy requires not just a reallocation of resources
between countries but also adequate poverty impact
assessments of individual programmes. This is by no
means an easy process to undertake. Similarly enhanc-
ing the role of the non-state actors presents challenges
in implementation as great, if not greater, than working
through established governments, no matter how poor
their performance. Ensuring that small local
organisations are representative, effective and free of
corruption will present a major resource-intensive chal-
lenge.
Considerable attention has also been paid to what
has become known as the 3 Cs – Coordination,
Complementarity and Cohesion (for details on 3 Cs see
www.three-cs.net). Ensuring the coordination and
complementarity of aid programmes is essential for
ensuring their effectiveness. Duplication of programme
planning and reporting/monitoring has also placed a
substantial burden on the administrations of many de-
veloping countries, countries whose public administra-
tions are already recognised as weak. The EC, before
its recent reforms, had even recruited local technical
assistants in competition with local governments. Co-
ordinating country aid programmes requires not only
intra-EU coordination between the EC’s and the bi-lat-
eral country programmes of the Member States, but
between all donors. This has been recognised interna-
tionally as reflected in the recent Paris Declaration on
Aid Effectiveness (2005). Within the EU the Action Plan
(COM(2006)87) offers a number of elements that will
contribute to greater coordination and complementarity.
These extend from the establishment of databases on
aid and procedural requirements, to harmonisation
‘roadmaps’ and participation in joint OECD/DAC moni-
toring. Similarly the EC is proposing extending its com-
mon CSP framework for adoption by all Member States
and moving towards Joint Multi-annual Programming
across EC and bi-lateral aid programmes, with joint dis-
bursement and monitoring. In terms of coordination the
EC recognises the need for focus and specialisation. It
is proposing a framework for co-financing, with either
the EC or specific Member States taking the lead in
particular countries.
One of the criticisms of the EC’s aid programme
has been its lack of focus. In response the original De-
velopment Policy Statement had proposed that the EC
concentrate upon eight areas in which it was regarded
as having a comparative advantage – aid related to trade
and development, regional integration, macro-economic
support, transport, rural development, health, educa-
tion and institution building. Unfortunately the 2005 Policy
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Statement further extended this list to include water and
energy provision, and ‘social cohesion and develop-
ment’.
Coordination also has a wider dimension which of-
fers the EC a potentially unique role in contributing to
aid effectiveness through the adoption of elements of
the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) (Dearden
2005). The needs of administrative harmonisation and
innovations in joint funding are already delivering ele-
ments of the OMC. The EC has already been man-
dated to undertake annual reporting on the Member
States implementation of their pledges on aid targets
and to propose corrective measures where progress
is regarded as insufficient.  This process may lead to
“opportunities for collective benchmarking” (EC 2004),
one of the most significant components of the OMC,
opening the door as it does to peer review. In a broader
sense this process can contribute to aid effectiveness
through the diffusion of best practice in bilateral
programmes, as a result of the exchange of informa-
tion between the Member States, and foster policy con-
vergence through the enhanced dialogue between indi-
vidual governments.
Policy coherence requires that the EU be consis-
tent across its various polices ensuring, for example,
that its trade policies are compatible with its develop-
ment policy objectives.  Trade is a particular pertinent
example since the EU has sole competence, but other
areas of EU policy will clearly interact with development
policy. Indeed this raises one of the most significant
questions for political scientists and development stud-
ies academics, the relationship between development
policy and other ‘foreign policy’ objectives, as reflected
for example in the Common Foreign and Security Policy.
Are the instruments of development policy to be re-
garded merely as one tool amongst many in the pursuit
of the EU’s wider external objectives or are they ‘ring-
fenced’ in the realisation of the EU’s commitments to
international development? These contrasting views are
reflected in the debate as to the current organisational
structure. The existence of a separate DG Develop-
ment, responsible only for ACP relations, appears in-
consistent with the responsibility of DG Relex for all other
developing countries. The approach of DG Relex is far
more likely to subsume development policy to wider
external relations considerations then DG Development.
The increasing emphasis upon issues such as mi-
gration control in the political dialogue with the ACP
states and with countries in the “near-abroad” is seen
as a reflection of these wider considerations. The con-
sistency and transparency with which the EC assesses
‘needs’ and ‘performance’ or applies sanctions in the
case of breaches of the fundamental or essential ele-
ments of Cotonou may also offer some interesting in-
sights into the nature of EU development policy. For
some commentators the abolition of the Development
Council of Ministers and its absorption into the General
Affairs and External Relations Council reflects the EU’s
relative priorities. Meanwhile the debate about the
‘budgetisation’ of the EDF i.e. its amalgamation into the
general budget of the EU, favoured by the EC and some
member governments, has raised objections from the
ACPs who fear the loss of these ‘ring-fenced’ develop-
ment funds.
Indeed it is naive not to view development policy in
its broader context and to distinguish between the sig-
nificant European NGO lobby’s objectives and the real-
ity of EU development policy formulation in its wider
external relations perspective. Considerations of eco-
nomic interest and security are no less significant in
the understanding of the EU’s trade and aid relations
with the developing world than in any other external re-
lations.
Stephen J. H. Dearden is lecturer in Political Economy
at Manchester Metropolitan University, UK
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Book Reviews
EUSA members interested in reviewing recent
EU- related books, please contact the reviews
editor:
Dr. Andrew Smith
CERVL
Sciences po Bordeaux
Domaine Universitaire
11 Allée Ausone,
Pessac 33607, France
E-mail  a.smith@sciencespobordeaux.fr
Fax 56 84 43 29
Publishers should send two review copies of books
directly to Dr. Smith.
Michael E. Smith. Europe’s Foreign and Secu-
rity Policy: The Institutionalization of Cooperation.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
THIS IS AN AMBITIOUS BOOK that seeks to explain EU foreign
and security policies since their inception in the appar-
ently unpromising guise of European Political Coopera-
tion (EPC) in the early 1970s. Smith puts forward the
interesting and ultimately  convincing argument that
‘institutionalisation’ of foreign and security policies within
the EU has lead to greater cooperation in these areas.
A particular strength of the book is the manner in
which the author is careful to specify his terminology
as clearly and precisely as possible. The stages of
institutionalisation, therefore, are explained as: the es-
tablishment of a policy domain as an intergovernmen-
tal forum; increased information sharing; norm creation
and codification; an increasing role for EU organisations
and finally, moves towards what could be termed gov-
ernance (the authority to make, implement and enforce
rules in a specified domain).
Smith convincingly argues that the history of EC/
EU foreign and security policies is a history of
institutionalisation, with successive periods witnessing
a steady move up his continuum. The book is based on
an impressive amount of empirical research, including
obviously highly productive participant interviews. The
author displays a formidable grasp of not only the insti-
tutional complexities that characterise EU involvement
in these spheres, but also of a wide variety of its foreign
and security policy activities.
The book is perhaps somewhat less successful,
however, when it comes to illustrating a clear link be-
tween the various stages of institutionalisation referred
to above, and cooperation defined in empirical terms
as ‘specific collective actions or outcomes’ (p. 50). As
the author himself recognises (p. 60), ‘correlation does
not necessarily mean causation’, and I am not really
convinced that what follows illustrates anything much
more than correlation.
Part of the reason for this concerns the sheer breath
of ground the author has set out to cover. The subject
is a large one, and Smith is necessarily unable to go
into great detail on all aspects of it.  Convincingly illus-
trating a causal link between institutionalisation and
cooperation would require at least some consideration
of the motivations of the major actors (the member
states) in undertaking this cooperation. Indeed, fully
understanding EU foreign policy requires a detailed
knowledge of these member states. Thus, while Smith
refers to the issue of changes within nation states as
representing one aspect of institutionalisation, he sim-
ply does not have the space to consider this in any de-
tail. He refers at one point (p. 59)  to ‘sympathetic
changes in national bureaucratic structures in order to
fulfil the responsibilities of EU foreign policy coopera-
tion’ as one aspect of this institutionalisation, yet in some
cases such adaptation is defensive rather than ‘sym-
pathetic’, and only careful empirical investigation can
ascertain which.
Similarly, the author raises many fascinating theo-
retical issues, but is unable to address all of them in the
detail they deserve. Notable amongst these is the pos-
sibility that preferences are endogenous and themselves
altered as  function of habits and experience of coop-
eration in an institutional setting.
None of the above, however, should detract from
the fact that Smith has written a clear, theoretically in-
teresting and hugely informative book on EU foreign and
security policies. Such shortcomings as there are stem
from an excess of ambition rather than any intrinsic in-
tellectual failings. The book is one that that promises to
remain a, if not the, standard work in the area for some
time to come.
Anand Menon
University of Birmingham
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Andrew Jordan and Adrian Schout. The Coordina-
tion of the European Union: Exploring the capaci-
ties of networked governance. Oxford, UK: Oxford
University Press, 2006.
JORDAN AND SCHOUT HAVE PRODUCED an extremely valuable
book on networked governance. It is essentially a case
study of environmental policy and specifically its inte-
gration across the full portfolio of public policy (Environ-
mental Policy Integration – EPI). However, the study is
not simply one for students of EU environmental policy.
Rather, it should be of great interest for students of new
modes of governance; of the national coordination of
EU policy; of the Lisbon Strategy; and of coordination
within EU institutions themselves. The reason for this
broad impact is that EPI is a policy that needs national
governments and EU institutions to coordinate internally
and with each other if its objectives are to be achieved.
As an example of networked governance, the study pro-
vides an important detailed test as to whether the hopes
that have been set by new modes of governance can
be delivered. These hopes are held in particular for the
EU’s Lisbon Strategy of economic competitiveness
because it entails coordination across a range of policy
issues as well as ensuring that all 27 member states
as well as the EU institutions are tuned into the com-
mon objectives.
In undertaking their study Jordan and Schout high-
light the multi-level coordination challenges that are
posed by networked governance. Drawing upon the
management and public administration literatures they
devise a framework for evaluating coordination, since
traditional toolkits tend to rely on ‘command-and-con-
trol’ patterns of governance. As necessary context they
outline the history of EPI, which has gone through sev-
eral iterations over the period since 1972. Indeed, the
EU has also spawned different processes for achiev-
ing similar objectives but the authors regard the ‘Cardiff
Process’, initiated under the UK’s 1998 presidency, as
the most clearly defined of these. Three member states
are taken to illustrate performance on EPI at the do-
mestic level: Germany, the Netherlands and the UK.
These states have all had aspirations to put EPI into
effect at the domestic level, thus raising the question
as to how these separate domestic processes enmesh
with the EU’s endeavours. The latter are explored
through exploring the coordination capacities of the
Commission and the Parliament.
For those who favour the mainstreaming of envi-
ronmental policy objectives across the EU and the
member states the findings are somewhat depressing.
Politicians at national and EU levels have made posi-
tive pronouncements. Performance, however, has been
much less satisfactory in general terms, although per-
formance amongst the five governance case studies
has been quite varied. The UK is the best placed of the
three member governments for achieving coordination,
whereas performance in Germany is weakest largely
because of its tradition of ministerial autonomy. As these
member states are generally regarded to be amongst
the policy ‘leaders’ on the environment, and therefore
not exactly typical cases, the reader can only specu-
late on performance in states with weaker administra-
tive traditions. At supranational level coordination within
the Parliament is weak, whilst the Commission has been
seeking to improve its performance. However, there is
always the problem of trying to maintain EPI as a prior-
ity – especially when the Barroso Commission is
prioritising a partially conflicting set of objectives in the
‘Growth and Jobs Agenda’ (the re-launched Lisbon Strat-
egy).
If the empirical findings are somewhat bleak, the
authors are to be congratulated on several counts. First,
they have written a path breaking book that highlights
the coordination problems raised by networked gover-
nance. Secondly, they have developed a valuable ana-
lytical framework for exploring coordination under such
conditions. Thirdly, they have offered some practical
proposals for improved coordination. And thirdly, they
have revealed how EPI is indeed worthy of their desig-
nation of it, namely as a ‘wicked’ policy problem.
Simon Bulmer
University of Sheffield
Christine Ingebritsen. Scandinavia in World Poli-
tics. Lanham, UK: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006.
OFTEN SELF-DEPICTED  - in a typically modest way - as
“small and at the periphery”, Nordic countries have,
however, been trying to play a certain role in the
international arena as “moral powers”. The basic
contribution of this book is to explain how they can exert
influence in this respect. There is, obviously, a strong
value dimension in the foreign policies of the five states
which often aim at advocating measures consistent with
their own domestic models. The author refers to
Scandinavian activism in the fields of human rights,
democratization, gender equality, the environment but
she also mentions, unsurprisingly, peace diplomacy (eg.
the 1993 Oslo agreement between the Israelis and the
Palestinians), the symbolic importance of the Nobel
Peace Prize, generous provision of aid or a particularly
strong involvement in international organizations (U.N.,
W.H.O., etc.).
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The book contains seven short chapters. Each deals
with a different set of issues  - such as European
integration (mainly seen, characteristically enough, in
terms of influence over the E.U.), the roots of
Scandinavian exceptionalism, how to turn global
challenges into opportunities for each of the countries
concerned. A chapter is dedicated to the Norwegian case
whilst those of Finland et Iceland are jointly examined
within another. Sweden and Denmark are not forgotten,
but are only discussed when considered to be of
particular relevance to a topic (the challenges  of
immigration and multi-culturalism for instance).
C. Ingebritsen’s main thesis is that Scandinavia has
become a “norm entrepreneur” with an impact on world
affairs that should not be underestimated. Some
aspects which might seem to contradict this line of
argumentation - Norwegians and Icelanders resisting
the International Whaling Convention moratorium for
example - are not ignored. However, in my opinion, the
point of view defended in this book is often too one-
sided and even idealistic. By this I do not mean to say
that Scandinavian moral standpoints  amount to mere
wishful thinking, but when these (small) countries are
confronted with the crude realities of International
Relations they also have to adapt. For instance, one of
the reasons why the European Union has been
represented so sceptically in a country like Sweden has
much to do with the image of distance and non-
transparency which surround international summits.
The Swedish presidency of the EU (during the first
semester of 2001) certainly tried to present a different
picture, but did not really succeed in doing so - mainly
for security reasons. In short, research needs to
question to which extent Nordic officials can and do
systematically stick to their own codes? Are they not
sometimes constrained to submit themselves to other
ways of behaving – if only for the sake of diplomatic
efficiency? Both attitudes currently co-exist and the book
ought to have also taken this realistic approach into
consideration, alongside the idealistic one.
Jean-Pascal Daloz
(Institute for Political Studies, SPIRIT,
Bordeaux & University of Oslo)
UACES is pleased to present an innovative series of
lunchtime seminars in Brussels. At each seminar, a
distinguished scholar will be invited to present and
discuss their research on a specific aspect of EU policy
using methods of political science, economics, law or
other related disciplines.
The seminar series offers academics and
practitioners an opportunity to keep abreast of the state-
of-the-art in Contemporary European Studies as well
as a forum for invited speakers to receive constructive
and impartial feedback on research-in-progress from
a broad, multidisciplinary audience.
Further information about the seminars can be
found below or obtained from dermot.hodson@
ec.europa.eu. The seminars will be from 1:00 to
2:00pm, with a sandwich lunch provided from 12:30pm.
The seminars will be hosted by The Centre, 22 Avenue
Marnix, 1000 Brussels.
The seminars are free to attend and open to current
UACES members, EUSA members, and those who
wish to join the association. Places are limited so please
reserve a place in advance by sending an email with
UACES in the title to meet@thecentre.eu, stating your
name and your institution/organisation and indicating
whether you are already an individual or corporate
member of UACES.
UACES Brussels Seminars
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The German Presidency and Treaty Reform:
The European Family in the House
without Windows?
Colette Mazzucelli*
Introduction
DURING 2005, WELL IN ADVANCE of its Council Presidency,
the Federal Republic of Germany set a political goal to
keep the member states of the European Union together
in the midst of the crisis that began with the French and
Dutch rejections of the European Constitutional Treaty.
After two failed referendums, the Heads of State and
Government called for a reflection period for the mem-
bers of the Union to take stock of the situation and de-
cide on next steps to take. Under the leadership of Chan-
cellor Angela Merkel, the German Presidency, which
lasted from January through June 2007, established a
timetable to reach agreement among the 27 member
states as to how to proceed with treaty reform. The
Presidency implemented a high-risk strategy within its
six months in the Chair. It was able to make the most of
the election of Nicholas Sarkozy as French president
to work through the difficulties likely to be posed for
France as well as the United Kingdom, the Czech Re-
public, the Netherlands, and Poland in treaty reform. In
order to lead the Union out of the crisis that overshad-
owed other dossiers of common interest and impor-
tance to the member states, like climate change, en-
ergy security, and economic competitiveness, the Ger-
man Presidency decided to forego the open process
that defined the method of the European Convention.
The discussions that led to the decisions taken at the
Brussels European Council on 21-22 June were re-
stricted to a limited group of high-level officials from the
27 member states. This essay analyzes the approach
of the German Presidency to treaty reform, the results
achieved by securing a consensus agreement on a pre-
cise ‘Draft IGC Mandate,’ and the implications of the
method of treaty reform discussions the Presidency
chose. Each of these points, approach to treaty reform,
results achieved, and implications of method, are sig-
nificant for the next phase in the overall process: the
intergovernmental conference to be convened on 23
July under the Portuguese Presidency. The fundamen-
tal reason for the rejection of the European Constitu-
tional Treaty, the gap between elites and citizens, re-
mains unaddressed. This fact has implications for a
persistent constraint: the fact that treaty reform must
be subject to a referendum in Ireland and possibly in
more than one other member state.
Germany at the Helm: A Discrete and Direct Ap-
proach to Talks on a Draft IGC Mandate
The German Presidency fulfilled the role of media-
tor in its efforts to facilitate another round of treaty re-
form negotiations. Its own national interest was to gain
an acceptance by a consensus decision among the 27
member states of a precise Draft IGC Mandate that
would allow the Portuguese Presidency to open and
conclude an intergovernmental conference to reform
the Treaty of Nice in a very short period of time. The
German Presidency controlled the process by which
politicians and high-level civil servants had to solve the
problems that resulted from the fact that 18 member
states had ratified the European Constitutional Treaty,
including Spain and Luxembourg by national referenda,
and 5 had outstanding difficulties, including France and
the Netherlands. Usually political problems are solved
at the end of negotiations on treaty reform. After the
reflection period, however, the Presidency had to ad-
dress the outstanding political problems up front in or-
der to transition from reflection to action.
Three phases can be identified in the German
Presidency’s approach: conceptual; exploratory; and
operative. In the conceptual phase, which dates back
to 2005, those responsible in Germany for treaty re-
form questions had to think about how to move ahead,
to narrow the Presidency’s options in terms of approach,
and to work towards an agreement that every member
state could accept. By December 2006, the contours
of a deal emerged. Early in the Presidency, Chancellor
Merkel set the tone for the months to come in her
speech before the European Parliament. The
Chancellor’s emphasis was on the values with which
Europeans could identify.1  The exploratory phase in
January and February involved separate bilateral talks
between the Presidency and each member state in
which officials from the Council Secretariat also par-
ticipated. In these bilateral meetings, the main issues
of concern were identified with the goal to define those
points on which there was flexibility to compromise.
During the Presidency, Federal Chancellor Angela
Merkel, Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, Min-
ister Director Uwe Corsepius, and State Secretary
Reinhard Silberberg met internally to discuss potential
compromises. Dr. Corsepius in the Chancellor’s Of-
fice and Dr. Silberberg in the Foreign Office were the
‘focal points’ for the German Presidency. Every mem-
ber state provided focal points as well by giving the
German Presidency the names of one or two persons
representing their respective leaders in the discussions
on treaty reform. A list of the focal points was the means
of communication from the Presidency to the other
member states.
The operative phase started after 25 March, the date
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of the Berlin European Council. This more informal
meeting of the Heads of State and Government saw
the introduction of the Berlin Declaration, which is sig-
nificant in that it mentions 2009 as the target date for a
new treaty to enter into force. In this way, the new treaty
would coincide with the next round of elections to the
European Parliament as well as a new European Com-
mission. It is important to recognize the importance of
the atmosphere surrounding the Berlin Declaration in
the German capital. Chancellor Merkel’s engagement
was once again clear. The signal to the other member
states was one to proceed together in an inclusive way.
This was an occasion to celebrate an anniversary, the
50th anniversary of the signing of the Treaties of Rome,
as well as a reunion to commit the member states to
accomplish treaty reform. Once the French presiden-
tial elections were concluded, Mr. Sarkozy’s victory in
the second round on 6 May opened the possibility of
engaged French leadership. President Sarkozy’s idea
of a mini-treaty gained acceptance. The remaining
weeks of the Presidency were filled with intense meet-
ings and conversations to sort out the remaining diffi-
culties, particularly with the British, Dutch, and Polish.
The Brussels European Council: Tough Negotia-
tions to Achieve a Precise Mandate
During very hard negotiations over several days,
Chancellor Merkel ably managed to preserve the work
of the European Convention while at one point assert-
ing that the Union would move ahead to convene an
intergovernmental conference without Poland if this
became necessary. Other leaders assisted the Chan-
cellor in a general effort not to isolate the Polish leader.
French President Sarkozy demonstrated a will to over-
come the crisis in which Poland was the only delega-
tion to call voting rights in the Council openly into ques-
tion. Its slogan ‘Nice or Death’ spoke directly to Poland’s
goal to retain the advantages which the country received
in Council voting under the Treaty of Nice.2  For the Pol-
ish delegation, it was important that its voice be heard
by Germany as a partner on the issue of Council vot-
ing. For the German Presidency, this dossier was one
that, if reopened, threatened to unravel the entire insti-
tutional compromise. As a member state, the issue of
Council voting was also of considerable importance to
the Federal Republic. The Polish delegation brought up
this issue repeatedly in bilateral talks. The preoccupa-
tion with voting rights led the Polish to fall back on the
‘square root’ proposal, which suggested that Council
voting weights be determined by the square root of each
national population.
At the Brussels European Council, President
Sarkozy, using corridor diplomacy in an effort to avoid
isolating Poland, suggested to his counterpart that a
transition period in majority voting could be envisaged.
The Draft IGC Mandate does contain a provision stat-
ing that between 2014 and 2017 the majority voting rules
established by the Treaty of Nice may be applicable, if
requested by a member state. Any development in
which another member state besides Poland sought to
revisit the majority voting rules was one which Germany,
in its role as Chair and as a member state, saw as a
potential impediment to achieve consensus among the
Union of 27. The German Presidency held a hard line
on this issue, which was a high-risk strategy to close a
deal under severe time constraints. While there were
certainly other national concerns the German Presi-
dency had to address over the course of negotiations,
the Polish threat of veto overshadowed the Brussels
European Council. In this context, the influence of the
Kaczyñski brothers, the twins who are respectively the
president and prime minister of the country, must be
taken into account.3  The Polish people remain largely
in favor of European integration, which the German
Presidency and other member states understand.
The concrete result the German Presidency had to
achieve was a precise Draft IGC Mandate, which the
Portuguese government established as a condition for
its Presidency to convene an intergovernmental con-
ference. As a follow up to the work of its predecessor,
the Portuguese Presidency has established a strict time-
table opening the intergovernmental conference on 23
July with technical work continuing through the month
of August. During the month of September any political
questions that arise are to be addressed in order to
prepare the text for signature during the informal Lisbon
European Council on 18-19 October. The signed Lisbon
Treaty must then be translated into the different official
languages of the Union before the ratification period
opens late in 2007. The goal is to finish the national
ratifications in the 27 member states by early 2009. The
German Presidency stayed focused on the goal of try-
ing to preserve as much as possible of the content in
the European Constitutional Treaty while working toward
a mandate that could result in a new Reform Treaty in
several parts. The first part, the Treaty on the European
Union (TEU), is meant to contain 40-45 articles, includ-
ing common provisions, provisions on democratic prin-
ciples, provisions on institutions, provisions on en-
hanced cooperation, general provisions on the Union’s
external action and specific provisions on the Common
Foreign and Security Policy, and final provisions.4  The
German Presidency’s hope is that this would be a docu-
ment which, after consolidation, citizens would want to
read. The second part, presently the Treaty Establish-
ing the European Community, is to be called the Treaty
on the Functioning  of the Union, and will contain most
of the technical provisions that were in the European
Constitutional Treaty. In fact, 80-85% of the content of
the European Constitutional Treaty has been retained
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in the Reform Treaty through the efforts of the German
Presidency. This fact leads us to raise questions about
the choice of method and the implications of the dis-
crete, intergovernmental approach for deliberations
concerning the eventual national ratifications in the 27
member states.
The German Presidency’s Method of Choice: Con-
siderations for the Future
While the Polish demands were the last to be ad-
dressed during the Brussels European Council at 4:30
am on Saturday morning, 23 June, the Dutch posed a
number of issues, resolved the week before that meet-
ing, which highlight the prospect of difficulties to over-
come in future ratifications. The Netherlands faced a
situation in which the distance between its parliament
and its population was too wide to ignore in the no vote
that was the result of its consultative referendum on
the European Constitutional Treaty.5  For this reason, it
was necessary for the Dutch to secure agreement in
the Brussels European Council on a shorter treaty, on
the removal of the word ‘constitution,’ and the exclusion
of all references to symbols like a European flag and
anthem, in what is named the Reform Treaty in the Draft
IGC Mandate. The Dutch rejection, in addition to that of
the French, was enough for the German Presidency to
conclude that any referendum on a future treaty is one
referendum too many. The only country that is commit-
ted to hold a referendum on a future treaty that member
states sign during the 2007 IGC is Ireland. This is a
member state with considerable experience in referen-
dums on treaty reform having rejected the Treaty of Nice
and then secured ratification in a second popular vote.
The Irish have established a national forum on Eu-
rope to educate the Irish people about the issues at
stake.6  The motto that inspired the second Nice refer-
endum is one that retains its relevance today: ‘If you
don’t know, vote no’. There is an inherent danger that
Ireland’s referendum may not be the only one that is
called among the 27 member states. A chain reaction
may take place if the British prime minister comes un-
der pressure to call a referendum given the argument
that has already been made in public: although the word
‘constitution’ has been removed from the new text, the
content of the Reform Treaty is much the same as the
European Constitutional Treaty, which two founding
member states previously rejected. If the United King-
dom decides to opt for a national referendum before
2009, France could come under pressure to hold one
as well, and the Netherlands could likely follow.
The reasons for the German Presidency’s method
of choice signal a belief that the decision to
constitutionalize the European Union went ‘too far, too
fast’ for many of the populations in member states. The
Presidency returned to the traditional way of treaty re-
form to avoid the Brussels bubble where the media can
seize hold of a topic in treaty reform and open the issue
up to popular and public confrontations. Elites have
come to perceive the experience of the last two years
as illustrative of the fact that citizens are not always
prepared to vote on the question being asked in treaty
reform, and often cannot make an educated choice
given their relative lack of knowledge about the issues
at stake. In another sense, however, a popular referen-
dum may foster an important national debate about the
European Union, as was the case in France in 1992
and 2005.7  In this sense, the decision to call a referen-
dum on treaty reform requires discipline by national lead-
ers not to use the Union as an object of their political
manipulations. This is not simply an idealistic wish. It is
a political imperative if the Union is to progress as a
global actor in this century serving the interests of its
states and citizens alike. A referendum exposes the fate
of integration to the perils of domestic games. The
French case illustrates that in 1992 and 2005 two dif-
ferent presidents of the Fifth Republic were each will-
ing to pose the question of ‘Europe’ as a way to divide
the political opposition using a Machiavellian tactic. The
1992 vote should have indicated to European leaders
the extent to which a referendum exposes divisions in
French public opinion on the question of integration’s
future.8  In this context, the choice of a behind closed
doors classical negotiation method, when followed by
a voluntarist desire on the part of certain national lead-
ers to mislead their own populations, is symptomatic of
a phenomenon used to describe the French Fourth
Republic: the house without windows. Inside the house
the member states of the larger European family set
their own pace to exit from a treaty reform crisis. The
time constraints of the six-month rotating Council Presi-
dency dictate the course of action. This leaves millions
of people outside to discover that the integration pro-
cess, which makes a qualitative difference in their daily
lives, has evolved in ways they hardly conceive. This is
the real crisis of integration,9  which national leaders
sooner or later will be called again by popular demand
responsibly to confront.
Colette Mazzucelli is a professor at Molloy College,
Rockville Centre, NY
*The author expresses her appreciation to the German Fulbright
Commission for its organization of the 2007 German Studies
Seminar in Brussels and Berlin, to colleagues who kindly permit-
ted interviews in the Federal Chancellor’s Office and the Federal
Foreign Office in Berlin, for discussions at Notre Europe in Paris
and the Center for Applied Policy Research in Munich, as well as
to the Wilton Park staff for the informative program discussions
during Conference 862: The European Union’s Institutional Fu-
ture: Prospects for the Inter-Governmental Conference and Be-
yond at Natolin in Warsaw, Poland.
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From the Chair
The strength of the EUSA conference has, in my mind,
always been that it fires up intellectual debate. Can we
maintain this unique quality even as we grow?
1) Decentralizing the program committee
The size of the conference has stretched our pro-
gram format to the limit. For the past ten conferences,
the system was the same: over a fall weekend, a com-
mittee of five to seven people met to sift collectively
through the applications, select papers, constitute pan-
els, and line them up in a coherent program. With over
900 paper proposals, this has become almost impos-
sible for a single team to handle. The obvious solution
is to follow the model used in larger associations, such
as the APSA, the ISA or the ECPR, which is to decen-
tralize.
2) Beyond area studies
Our conference is first and foremost, and should
remain, the home of EU scholars. Yet it should also
appeal to scholars with a secondary interest in Euro-
pean integration. In the early 1990s, EU studies became
a desirable specialization at the top research schools
because it piqued the theoretical interest of top schol-
ars—not all of them self-professed EU specialists. Per-
haps we should think hard about how to become more
pro-active in bringing more diverse intellectual energy
to EUSA.
3) Poster sessions?
Poster sessions have obvious plus points: they privi-
lege dialogue over monologue, reward original presen-
tation, encourage ideas-shopping, facilitate networking,
and, not least, accommodate larger numbers of paper
givers. Earlier EUSA experiments with poster sessions
had mixed success. Perhaps we got the incentives
wrong: no senior scholars, posters tucked in the hotel’s
corner, poor rationale behind grouping posters, com-
petition with high-profile panels. We might change our
mind if a) posters of graduates and senior scholars rub
shoulders, b) in a central meeting space, c) where poster
stands alternate with book and journal stands, d) dur-
ing fixed time slots privileging posters over panels, e)
with an opportunity for poster session participants to
nominate up to three papers as best conference poster
paper, f) and café latte available!
4) Working groups?
The APSA recently introduced working groups. The
formula is simple: a small number of participants band
together to attend the same posters and panels, and
follow this up with group discussion. An expert scholar
acts as facilitator. This formula could appeal to research-
ers/teachers honing a new topic, first-time visitors or
graduates desiring intellectual guidance, teachers re-
freshing their syllabus, or scholars interested in net-
working. Working groups would, I think, add spice to
poster and panel discussions.
5) Reaching out
The EUSA conference is the single-most important
venue for research on European integration. It has not
been particularly welcoming to ‘consumers’. Can we
do a better job in reaching out to, say, college teach-
ers? We might consider introducing teaching work-
shops, perhaps in collaboration with the EU Centers of
Excellence?
I invite you to share your ideas on these and other
ways to improve the EUSA conference. Please send
ideas/proposals/comments to Joe Figliulo at
eusa@pitt.edu. A selection will appear in subsequent
Newsletters.
The next conference will take place in Marriott Ma-
rina Del Rey in Los Angeles, April 23-25, 2009. It is a
superb setting.
Liesbet Hooghe
Amsterdam, July 8, 2007
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EUSA Lifetime Membership
What is it?
Simply put, it is a one-time dues payment
to EUSA of US$ 1500.
What does it include?
The Lifetime Membership includes
all regular membership benefits for life.
Among those benefits currently are
subscription to the quarterly EUSA Review,
receipt of occasional EUSA monographs,
discounted registration rates at the EUSA
International Conference, subscription to
our e-mail List Serve, and the opportunity
to join EUSA interest sections.
Are there any other benefits?
By making a one-time membership
payment, you not only avoid the task of
renewing each year, but gain the twin
advantages of securing lifetime
membership at today’s dollar values and
avoiding future dues increases.
Who should do this?
Any person wishing to support the
endeavors of the European Union Studies
Association—the fostering of scholarship
and inquiry on the European integration
project. For U.S. taxpayers, an additional
benefit is a receipt for a one-time $500
charitable contribution to EUSA, tax-
deductible to the extent allowed by law
(reducing your tax liability for the year in
which you become a Lifetime Member).
How do I become a Lifetime Member?
Simply mail your check, in US$ and made
payable to “EUSA,” to the European Union
Studies Association, address given at right.
(We can not accept lifetime membership
payments by credit card.) We will send
you a receipt and letter of
acknowledgment.
EUROPEAN UNION STUDIES ASSOCIATION
New Individual Membership Form Only (Please type or print)
Name ________________________________________________
Address ______________________________________________
_____________________________________________________
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State/Province________________  Postal Code_______________
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Your Professional Affiliation ______________________________
_____________________________________________________
Do you wish to be subscribed to
EUSA’s e-mail List Serve? _____ yes          _____ no
Membership dues (please check as appropriate):
Individual _____ $90 two-year membership
Student* _____ $55 two-year membership
Lifetime Membership _____ $1500 (+ credit for $500 tax deduction)
* Students must provide copy of current semester’s registration form.
EU Law Interest Section _____ $10 (2 yrs.)
EU Political Economy Interest Section _____ $10 (2 yrs.)
Teaching the EU Interest Section _____ $10 (2 yrs.)
EU Latin America Caribbean Interest Section _____ $10 (2 yrs.)
EU Economics Interest Section _____ $10 (2 yrs.)
EU Public Opinion and Participation Section _____ $10 (2 yrs.)
EU as Global Actor Section _____ $10 (2 yrs.)
EUSA Public Policy Interest Section _____ $10 )2 yrs.)
EUSA members may wish to make a contribution to support the work of
EUSA in any amount over membership dues:
EUSA Grants and Scholarships Fund $ _____
Ernst Haas Memorial Fund for EU Studies $ _____
Total amount of dues and gifts enclosed       $ ________
We prefer payment by check (payable to “EUSA”) when possible. Checks
must be in US$ and drawn on a USA bank. We also accept international
money orders and MasterCard or Visa credit cards. Your cancelled check
or credit card statement will be your receipt.
MasterCard  #  _________/__________/__________/_________
Visa  # _________/__________/__________/_________
Expiry ___/___  Last 3 digits from back side of card ___/___/___
Signature ____________________________________________
Mail or fax this form (please do not mail and fax this form) to:
European Union Studies Association
415 Bellefield Hall
University of Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh, PA 15260  USA
Facsimile 412.648.1168
EUSA Review    Summer 2007   25
Lifetime Membership
$1500 for all our materials, for life, and credit for a one-time tax-deductible contribution of $500
EUSA Grants and Scholarships Fund
to support EU-related scholarship, the EUSA prizes, and travel to the biennial EUSA Conference
Ernst Haas Memorial Fund for EU Studies
to honor the seminal work of Ernst B. Haas and support dissertation research in EU studies
Your gifts are tax-deductible to the extent allowable by U.S. tax law. Include a contribution with your membership
renewal, or contact the EUSA Office to make a contribution. Call 412.648.7635 or e-mail eusa@pitt.edu.
How to Support the
European Union Studies Association
Inside the Summer 2007 EUSA Review:
EUSA Review Forum 2
Reflections on Multilevel Legitimacy Fritz W. Scharpf
EU as a Global Actor Interest Section Essay 11
A Review of EU Development Policy Stephen J. H. Dearden
Book Reviews 17
EUSA  Review Essay 21
The German Presidency and Treaty Reform:  The European
Family in the House without Windows? Colette Mazzucelli
